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Abstract
Although global free trade is e¢ cient, each countrys benet from
free trade depends on the path that leads to the global free trade
agreement. Using a dynamic model of trading bloc formation, we
show that when global free trade is reached gradually, the countries
that are initially excluded gain less than the rest and may be even
made worse-o¤ by the nal free trade agreement, compared with the
initial state of no trading blocs.
1 Introduction
Does free trade benet all? Ohyama [9], Kemp and Wan [3] show that it
is possible that no country su¤ers from the formation of a trading bloc and
Konishi, Kowalczyk and Sjöström[5] show that it is possible that no coun-
try su¤ers from global free trade. We revisit the issue whether free trade
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benets all in a dynamic strategic model where countries can form trading
blocs endogenously. By forming a trading bloc, member countries agree on
the tari¤s on mutual trade (often implying free trade among members, i.e.,
the emergence of customs union) and on the tari¤s on their imports from
non-members. In our model, although global free trade eventually emerges
as the equilibrium outcome, some countries may benet more than others do.
In fact, it is possible for a country to be worse o¤ compared with the initial
situation where no trading bloc is formed (i.e., the noncooperative Nash equi-
librium situation). The driving forces of such a possibility are the negative
externalities a trading bloc imposes on outsiders and the strategic behavior
the countries entertain in forming a trading bloc. If those externalities are
very high, the countries who are left out of the intermediate trading bloc
obtain a lower welfare in the eventual free trade than the initial situation.
The literature on international trade agreements often considers a two-
stages process in order to depict the timing of such relationships. In the rst
stage, which is often referred to as the trade union (coalition) formation stage,
countries choose their partners in the trade agreements. In the second stage,
each trade union sets tari¤s given the partition from the rst stage. In this
stage, countries within each trade union behave cooperatively to maximize
their joint welfare, while the interactions among di¤erent trade unions are
noncooperative.
Sharing this common structure, models in the literature di¤er in the for-
malization of both stages. The di¤erences in the second stage depend on the
underlying economic model, while the di¤erences in the rst stage depend
on the approach to the coalition formation procedure. All the papers share
the common property that the grand coalition is e¢ cient, which is often
equivalent to asserting that free trade is the e¢ cient organization.
Concerning the rst stage, the core has been considered as a natural solu-
tion concept for analyzing a word-wide trade agreement and free trade. For
example, Riezman [10] and Macho-Stadler, Pérez-Castrillo and Ponsatí [8]
use the core to identify the stable partition of countries into customs unions.
These papers rule out the possibility of international transfers but account
for the externalities that a customs union inicts on other countries. Kowal-
czyk and Sjöström [6] and Konishi et al. [5] also take a cooperative approach
to the rst stage of the game, but they allow for monetary transfers among
countries. However, these models, like Ohyama [9] and Kemp and Wan [3],
do not consider externalities among the coalitions of countries, which simpli-
es the analysis of the transfer scheme within the countries when they sign a
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trade agreement. Kowalczyk and Sjöström [6], in a many-country monopoly
trade model, show that the grand coalition may require international income
transfers. They derive a formula for the transfers that leads to free trade (the
grand coalition forms) and supports the Shapley value as a core allocation.
Konishi et al. [5] show that global free trade can be an immediate outcome
without any customs union ever forming provided that transfer payments are
possible and customs unions have no e¤ects on non-member countries.
Burbidge, DePater, Myers and Sengupta [2] consider a one-shot noncoop-
erative game of coalition formation in the rst stage where countries simul-
taneously announce their partners for trading blocs. Their model allows for
both transfers and externalities. They show that when there are more than
two countries, global free trade may not be an equilibrium outcome. Our
paper complements the previous papers by considering a dynamic noncoop-
erative model of trading blocs formation. With such a framework, a subset
of countries forming a customs union or a trading bloc does not preclude the
global free trade agreement from being reached eventually. Casual observa-
tion does support gradual formation of trade unions. For example, before
NAFTA was formed, the United States and Canada were already enjoying
their bilateral trade agreements. Similarly, the European Union started with
only six countries, to reach the present membership through gradual admit-
tance of new members.
Concerning the second stage, di¤erent models of custom unions have been
analyzed in the literature. Kennan and Riezman [4] construct a pure ex-
change economy in which commodity demands in each country are generated
by a linear demand system. In their model all countries charge optimal tari¤s
given the structure of customs union and the tari¤s charged by other coun-
tries, but international transfers are not allowed. As the authors point out,
the analysis of optimal tari¤s is very complicated even when trade-agreements
are not considered. They generate some examples with three countries and
three goods that highlight some interesting aspects of the problem. In partic-
ular, the formation of custom unions can improve its members welfare relative
to free-trade. Burbidge et al. [2] consider a one-good model of capital tax
competition with interstate trade of mobile capital for the consumption good.
While their model is quite appealing, it is not analytically tractable. They
provide examples to illustrate, for example, that the grand coalition may
not be an equilibrium outcome. In view of this, we employ a very simple
three country model as in Macho-Stadler et al. [8] that is analytically solv-
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able even for asymmetric situations1 and at the same time generate payo¤
congurations qualitatively similar to those in Kennan and Riezman [4] and
Burbidge et al. [2]. Krishna [7] uses a model of imperfect competition similar
to ours and examine how bilateral trade agreement a¤ects multilateral trade
liberalization.
In a recent paper, Aghion, Antràs, and Helpman [1] consider a three-
country dynamic bargaining game where one country plays the role of a
leader or agenda setter who has the power to choose how negotiation is
to be conducted (multilaterally or sequentially). Their second-stage game is
a partition function game. They analyze the incentive of the agenda setter
in choosing the form of negotiation and show that free trade emerges when
payo¤s exhibit grand-coalition superadditivity.
We show that in equilibrium of our model the grand coalition is always
formed and engages in free trade. However, the grand coalition is not nec-
essarily formed in one step. Indeed, if countries are patient, a two country
trading bloc is formed rst, after which it merges with the third country to
form the grand coalition. In doing so, the two countries that form the ini-
tial trading bloc extract more surplus at the expense of the third countrys
welfare in the nal free trade agreement. In fact, the third country may be
worse o¤ in the end compared with the initial position where no trading bloc
is formed.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 examines the welfare properties of di¤erent trading bloc structures
and determines each countrys payo¤ as a function of the current trade bloc
structure and the sequence that leads to this trade bloc structure. Section 4
presents and analyzes the dynamic game of trading bloc formation. Proofs
are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider a three country model where a single homogeneous good is produced
and sold in each period. Countries are indexed by 1, 2, and 3. Each country
has one rm (also indexed by 1, 2, and 3) that produces the good and sells it
in the domestic and foreign markets. The markets in the di¤erent countries
are assumed to be segmented. The inverse demand function of country i; for
1Yi [11] also provides a solvable model but only for symmetric countries.
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i = 1; 2; 3; is
pi = ai  Qi;
where pi is the domestic price and Qi is the total amount sold in country i.
Let qij denote the quantity sold in country i by rm j. Then,
Qi = qi1 + qi2 + qi3:
As in Krishna [7], it is assumed that there is a competitively produced
numeraire good and that this numeraire good is freely traded across countries
to settle the balance of trade.2
Country i sets non-negative tari¤s tij  0 on rm js product sold in
country i, with tii interpreted as quantity tax on the domestic rm3. The
production cost function of rm i is Ci(q) = ciqi, where 0  c1  c2  c3 and
qi is the quantity produced by rm i. In each country i, rms choose quantity
in a noncooperative fashion given the tari¤s (ti1; ti2; ti3): The e¤ective unit
costs of rm js product sold in country i are (ci + tij) if the solution leads
rm j to produce in equilibrium. The reason for choosing such a model
is two-fold: it is analytically tractable and can generate payo¤ structures
similar to those in the literature. Moreover, for our purpose, a three country
model is su¢ cient.
If the solution is interior, in the unique Cournot (Nash) equilibrium, rm
j sells the following quantity in country i :
qij =
ai + (c` + ti`) + (ck + tik)  3(cj + tij)
4
; (1)
where j; k; l 2 f1; 2; 3g are distinct numbers. In equilibrium, the output that
rm j sells in country i is decreasing in its own e¤ective costs and increasing
in its rivalse¤ective costs. Note that by setting tij high enough, country
i could induce rm j not to sell in is domestic market. For simplicity,
we assume throughout the paper that the demand in every country is high
enough relative to costs, so that in equilibrium all rms are always active in
all three markets.4 Let ij be rm js prots in country i: Then,
ij = q
2
ij: (2)
2This is a two-good model of trade, where a quasilinear utility function generates the
demand for the oligopolistic good.
3We rule out export subsidies and rm subsidies by assumption.
4For asymmetric rms, with c1  c2  c3; a su¢ cient condition is ai > 11c3 5c2 5c1:
For symmetric rms (equal costs) this reduces to assume that ai > c for every country i:
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The consumer surplus in country i; if all rms sell in this country, is
CSi =
1
32
 
3ai  
3X
j=1
(cj + tij)
!2
: (3)
Note that each rms prots earned in country i and contribution to consumer
welfare in country i depend only on the tari¤ structure set in country i: The
domestic rms prots are increasing in the tari¤s applied to foreign rms
and decreasing in the tax on its own product. Consumer surplus in each
country is increasing in the total quantity sold in that country. This implies
that it is decreasing in the e¤ective costs of the rms that sell in the domestic
market and hence in the tari¤s ti1; ti2 and ti3.
Total welfare per period in country i is the sum of its consumer surplus,
the total prots of the domestic rm, and the total revenue from tari¤s/tax:
Wi = CSi +
3X
j=1
ji +
3X
j=1
tijqij: (4)
Note that total welfare in country i depends on the whole set of tari¤s since
the prots of the domestic rm depend on the tari¤s set by the three coun-
tries.
A group of countries can form a trading bloc. A partition describes how
the three countries organize themselves into trading blocs. The set of possible
partitions is given by P = fI; [12] ; [13] ; [23] ; Ng ; where,
I = (f1g; f2g; f3g)
[ij] = (fi; jg; fkg); where i; j; k 2 f1; 2; 3g are distinct
N = (f1; 2; 3g):
In these partitions, a country can either be a member of a trading bloc or
be alone in that it does not belong to any trading bloc and therefore it sets
tari¤s unilaterally. In the rst partition, all three countries are alone,
in which case, they behave noncooperatively by setting their Cournot-Nash
tari¤s. In the last partition, all three countries form a single trading bloc
(the grand coalition) and maximize their joint welfare. Each of the other
partitions involves a two-country trading bloc and one country being alone.
Given a partition of this type, the trading blocs objective is to maximize the
joint welfare of member countries while the interaction between the trading
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bloc and the third country is noncooperative. That is, we assume that only
transfers among countries in the same trading bloc are possible.
For any partition of the countries into trading blocs, we can determine
the equilibrium tari¤s and taxes given this partition. Taxes on domestic
rm decrease both domestic consumer surplus (3) and domestic rms prots
due to the decrease in its production (1) but increase tax revenue. Tari¤s
on foreign rms decrease domestic consumer surplus (3) while increasing
domestic rms prots and tari¤ revenue. We show in Appendix 1 that
in equilibrium, any country sets zero taxes on the domestic rms, and any
trading bloc chooses free trade among its members. In addition, the tari¤s on
the outsider(s) are increasing in the domestic demand and decreasing in the
production costs of the outsider(s). Full characterization of the equilibrium
taxes and tari¤s is presented in Appendix 1.5
Given the above equilibrium taxes and tari¤s we can determine each
trading blocs welfare for every partition. Let W Ii be country is welfare in
equilibrium when no trading blocs are formed. Let WNT denote the total
(global) welfare when the grand coalition/trading bloc forms. Lastly, given
partition [ij] ; let W [ij]ij be the joint welfare of countries i and j and W
[ij]
k
country ks welfare.
3 Payo¤s
In this section we ascertain countriess payo¤s associated with any trade
agreement structure P 2 fI; [12] ; [13] ; [23] ; Ng. We rst examine the prop-
erties of the welfare functions dened in the previous section.
3.1 Welfare Properties
Conditional on ruling out subsidies, the grand coalition yields the highest
total welfare (since a tari¤ agreement for any trading bloc can be mimicked
by the grand coalition). As for any trade agreement structure in which two
countries form a trading bloc, the next two propositions state the impact of
5Let us note that autarchy is always a possible outcome, if a country sets tari¤s in such
a way that no foreign rm sells in the domestic market. However, under our condition on
demands, as it is shown in Appendix 1, this does not arise in equilibrium.
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this trading bloc on the outsider and the incentives of the two insiders in
forming the trading bloc.
Proposition 1 The game is of negative externalities in that when two coun-
tries merge the third one su¤ers: W [ij]k < W
I
k for any i; j; k distinct.
Therefore, when two countries i and j form a trade union, the third coun-
try ks welfare is reduced, as compared to the situation where no trading bloc
is formed and this is true irrespective of the level of demand or production
cost in country k.
It can be shown that

W
[ij]
k  W Ik

is decreasing in ai and aj but does not
depend on ak. In addition,

W
[ij]
k  W Ik

is increasing in ck and, if demands
ai and aj are not too di¤erent, it is decreasing in ci and cj. Hence, the higher
the demands of the two countries in the trading bloc and the more e¢ cient
the outsider, the more harmful the agreement is for the outsider.
Proposition 2 Any two countries have an incentive to cooperate. That is,
W
[ij]
ij > W
I
i +W
I
j for i; j 2 f1; 2; 3g.
It is worth noting that the incentive for two countries to cooperate, mea-
sured by

W
[ij]
ij  W Ii  W Ij

; increases with the size of their demands, ai
and aj; and does not depend on the demand of the outsider ak: This expres-
sion is increasing in the cost of the outsider, ck and, when demands of the two
countries are not too di¤erent, it is decreasing in the costs of the cooperating
countries, ci and cj. Hence, the higher the demands of the two rms entering
an agreement and the less e¢ cient the outsider, the more incremental surplus
two countries will generate by forming a trading bloc.
3.2 Payo¤s Associated with Each Partition
When a new trading bloc is created, the change in each member countrys
welfare depends on the surplus generated by the new trade agreement and
the sharing rule the trading bloc adopts. To characterize each countrys
payo¤, we assume that members of the new trading bloc share equally the
incremental surplus6 (possibly via transfers). In doing so, we take the view
6Di¤erent sharing rules can be employed without altering the qualitative results, as we
shall illustrate in the next subsection.
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that each countrys payo¤ depends not only on the current trade agreement
structure but also on the sequence of trade agreement structures that precede
the current one. In particular, how the three countries in our framework share
the gain from free trade when the grand coalition forms depends on whether
the grand trading bloc forms directly or through some intermediate stage
where two of the countries form a trading bloc rst.
If all countries are alone, each country is, where i 2 f1; 2; 3g ; status quo
payo¤ is W Ii : If no trading bloc emerges, country is payo¤ in each period
remains W Ii . A subset of countries can form a trading bloc. If the rst trad-
ing bloc has only two members, then they share the surplus equally while
the third country sees its welfare reduced. Each countrys payo¤ remains
the same until the rst trading bloc merges7 with the third country to form
the grand coalition, in which case all countries share the incremental surplus
equally. Another possibility is that the three countries decide to form the
grand coalition directly. Once the grand coalition forms, each countrys pay-
o¤ in each period stays the same thereafter. Therefore, each countrys payo¤
only depends on the sequence of distinct partitions that have emerged thus
far. The set of possible sequences of partitions, each of which starts with I;
is
S = fI; I   [ij] ; I   [ij] N; I  Ngi;j2N;i6=j ;
where I depicts, for example, that no trading bloc has been formed and
I remains the current partition, while I   [ij]   N depicts that the grand
coalition forms via intermediate partition [ij]:
We now start with I and determine recursively the payo¤ allocations
associated with each of the above sequences. We shall denote by Vi (S)
the payo¤ (per period) of country i following sequence S 2 S: Obviously,
Vi (I) =W
I
i :
If the grand coalition is formed in one step, as denoted by sequence I N;
the incremental surplus is
(I  N) =WNT  
 
W I1 +W
I
2 +W
I
3

:
In this case country i receives the payo¤
Vi (I  N) =W Ii +
1
3
(I  N):
7We assume that a trading bloc never dissolves but can merge with the third country.
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If trading bloc fi; jg is formed (from I), it generates a surplus in the
amount of
(I   [ij]) =W [ij]ij  
 
W Ii +W
I
j

:
The payo¤ of country ` 2 fi; jg associated with sequence I   [ij] is
V` (I   [ij]) =W I` +
1
2
(I   [ij]);
while country ks (who stays isolated) payo¤ is
Vk(I   [ij]) =W [ij]k :
Consider now the case in which the grand coalition is formed through an
intermediary step where two countries, i and j; form a trade union rst. This
corresponds to the sequence (I   [ij] N).
The incremental surplus generated by forming the grand coalition via an
intermediary trading bloc fi; jg is
(I   [ij] N) =

WNT  

W
[ij]
ij +W
[ij]
k

:
Countriespayo¤s associated with the sequence (I   [ij] N) are as follows:
V` (I   [ij] N) = V`(I   [ij]) + 1
3
(I   [ij] N) for all ` 2 fi; jg,
Vk (I   [ij] N) = Vk(I   [ij]) + 1
3
(I   [ij] N).
Once we have determined each countrys per period payo¤associated with
every sequence in S; we proceed to present some properties of the countries
payo¤ functions.
Proposition 3 If the grand coalition eventually forms, being left out in the
rst round always results in the worst nal payo¤. Formally,
Vk (I   [ij] N) < minfVk (I   [jk] N) ; Vk (I   [ik] N) ; Vk(I  N)g
for distinct i; j;and k.
The next proposition shows that among the sequences leading to the
(eventual) formation of the grand coalition, any two countries prefer the one
in which they form a trading bloc rst.
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Proposition 4 Any pair of countries i and j benet by forming a trading
bloc rst. Formally,
Vi (I   [ij] N) > maxfVi (I   [jk] N) ; Vi (I  N)g
for distinct i; j; and k:
Recall that when countries i and j form a trading bloc rst, a negative
externality is imposed on country k. In fact, such a negative externality may
be large enough to make country k worse o¤ in the grand trading bloc than
when all countries are independent, although once i and j form a trading
bloc, it is in ks best interest to join them subsequently.
To illustrate the previous results, take the example where countries 1 and
2 are identical with a1 = a2 = 100 and c1 = c2 = 0, and country 3 has
a3 = 22 and c3 = 2: Then the payo¤ of the countries as a function of the
coalition structure and the path are:8
Sequence S V1 (S) V2 (S) V3 (S)
I 4090:75 4090:75 335:22
I   [12] 4471:945 4471:945 206:852
I   [12] N 4578:947 4578:947 313:854
I   [13] 4266:543 4015:703 511; 013
I   [13] N 4492:706 4241:866 737:176
I  N 4409:093 4409:093 653:563
In the table it is easy to see that when free trade is reached after some
countries have from a trading bloc, the countries involved in a intermediate
trading bloc benet more (and the country left out less) than when free trade
is reached in one step. The previous example, also illustrates the possibility
that the country left out of the trading bloc may end up worse o¤ at the end
than at the initial situation. This is the case for country 3; which is worse
o¤ in the end when the grand coalition is formed via (I   [12] N) than in
the singleton case.9
While the above properties that our payo¤functions exhibit (Propositions
1, 2 and 3) can be attributed to the Cournot model we employ, other models
8Note that (I  [23] N) will be similar to (I  [13] N) changing the payo¤s of player
1 and 2 since these countries are identical.
9It is not the case for country 2; which is better o¤ if the grand coalition is formed via
(I   [13] N) than in situation I:
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in the literature share the same characteristics as the previous example. This
is the case for the four examples in Kennan and Riezman [4] (pages 77 and
78). Taking the rst example of their paper (where countries are symmetric),
and adding transfers by applying the equal sharing of the surplus, we can
compute the countriespayo¤s for the di¤erent sequences:
Sequence S V1 (S) V2 (S) V3 (S)
I 79:77 79:77 79:77
I   [12] 88:56 88:56 68:80
I   [12] N 96:73 96:73 76:96
I  N 90:14 90:14 90:14
Note that as in this example, by merging sequentially, players 1 and 2
may increase their payo¤; however, country 3 losses at the end. The same
happens in the other examples presented in Kennan and Riezman [4].
The same features are present in the example presented by Burbidge et
al. [2]. For their example all countries share the same production technology,
a Cobb-Douglas function that uses capital and labour as inputs. Countries
di¤er in their input endowments. Countries 1 and 2 are similar and are
relatively capital-abundant. Country 3 has no capital, but has a large labour
endowment. Table 1 of their paper summarizes the payo¤s in terms of the
Nash Equilibrium in capital tax competition as a function of the coalition
structure. We add the payo¤of the grand coalition when it is reached through
the path (I   [12] N) or (I   [13] N) and we apply the equal sharing of
surplus generated when a trade bloc is formed. Then we have:
Sequence S V1 (S) V2 (S) V3 (S)
I 0:0736 0:0736 0:8235
I   [12] 0:1217 0:1217 0:6835
I   [12] N 0:1460 0:1460 0:7079
I   [13] 0:0771 0:0793 0:8270
I   [13] N 0:0775 0:0846 0:8327
I  N 0:0834 0:0834 0:8332
Note that 1 and 2 receive the highest payo¤s by forming a trading bloc
rst and then subsequently merging with 3. On the other hand, 3 is worse
o¤ compared to the situation with no trading blocs.
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4 Dynamic Formation of Trading Blocs
The previous section characterizes the payo¤s as a function of the trade
agreement structure reached by the countries. In this section we shall exam-
ine whether and how the grand trading bloc forms. In particular, we shall
identify which of the sequences specied in the previous section emerges as
an equilibrium outcome of a dynamic coalition formation game.
The formation of trading blocs is modeled as an innite horizon dynamic
game. For simplicity, all the countries are assumed to have the same discount
factor  2 [0; 1):
Each period  consists of two stages. Stage 1 determines the formation
of a trading bloc. At stage 2 countries simultaneously set tari¤s and rms
produce and sell the output in the three markets. Stage 2 determines the
payo¤s of the three countries as specied in Section 3: the payo¤s depend on
the current partition of countries and on the sequence of the trading blocs
that have been formed previously. The surplus generated by a trading bloc
is shared equally among its members10.
We consider a sequential bloc formation game with a xed protocol. In
particular, we assume that countries take their actions in stage 1 according
to the following exogenously given order (i; j; k): If the grand coalition forms,
the game ends. If a two-country trading bloc forms, it behaves like a single
entity. We can specify the protocol in such a way that the two-country
trading bloc and the third country take actions alternately with the third
country acting rst. It is worth noting that the order specied here does not
a¤ect the equilibrium outcome.
At each period a country or a two-country trade bloc becomes the pro-
poser and makes an o¤er to form a trading bloc. The game starts with all
countries being alone. Country i proposes a trading bloc that includes i:
All other members of the proposed bloc answer sequentially according to the
protocol by saying yes or no. If all members say yes, the bloc forms.
Otherwise, j becomes the next proposer. In the next period the protocol
selects a country or a trading bloc in the current partition to propose unless
the grand coalition has already formed, in which case the game ends.
Formally, at  = 1:
1.1 Country i; selected by the protocol, makes an o¤er to a subset B1 
f1; 2; 3g, i 2 B1; to form a trading bloc. The members of B1 n fig
10Note that the sharing rule is exogenously given.
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sequentially (following the protocol) decide whether to join or not. The
trading bloc B1 is formed if all the members agree. If B1 contains any
country other than fig ; the sequence is then S1 = I   B1: Otherwise,
no new trading bloc is formed and the sequence is S1 = I. Let us
denote by P1 2 fI; [12] ; [13] ; [23] ; Ng the resulting partition at the
end of  = 1:
1.2 Each country i 2 N obtains, at  = 1, payo¤ Vi(S1).
Consider any time  > 1: Let the partition structure after period    1
be P 1 and the sequence of (distinct) partitions until this time be S 1. If
P 1 is the grand coalition N , then the coalition structure after period  is
P = P 1; and the sequence S = S 1. Otherwise:
 .1 A country or a two-country trading bloc in P 1 is selected by the
protocol. The proposer makes an o¤er to a subset B  P 1 to form
a trading bloc. The proposer has to belong to B . The members of
B sequentially (following the protocol) decide whether to join or not.
The trading bloc B is formed if all the members agree.
 .2 The coalition structure at time  is P . The sequence of trading blocs
is given by S = S 1 if P = P 1; and S = S 1   B if P 6= P 1:
Country i 2 N obtains the payo¤ Vi(S ) at time  .
Vi(S ) for S 2 fI; I   [ij] ; I   [ij] N; I  Ngi;j2N;i6=j is the payo¤func-
tion dened in the previous section: whenever a new trading bloc forms, its
members share the surplus equally and if no new trading bloc forms, every
countrys payo¤ remains the same. Note that each countrys payo¤ in pe-
riod  depends only on the sequence of partitions that lead to the current
partition. Country i maximizes
1P
=1
Vi (S ) :
Note that in the above process of trading bloc formation, a trading bloc,
once formed, cannot dissolve but it remains in the negotiation with the pos-
sibility of entering a larger trading bloc. A prole of strategies constitutes
a subgame perfect equilibrium if its restriction to every subgame induces a
Nash equilibrium for that subgame. As in most of the literature on coali-
tion formation, we shall focus on pure strategy Markov Perfect Equilibrium
(MPE) in which each proposing countrys strategy only depends on the se-
quence of (distinct) partitions that have been formed thus far and each re-
sponding countrys strategy depends only on this sequence and the current
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proposal (but neither depends on the period or the details of the past history
of the game such as for how many periods a particular partition of countries
has been existed).
Given a MPE, let EVi(S ) be the discounted (at the beginning of  + 1)
payo¤ of country i in the subgame where the sequence of partitions formed
at period  is S :
Given that the grand coalition remains together once it is formed, it is
obvious that for S 2 fI   [ij] N; I  Ng
EVi(S ) =
1X
 0=1

0 1Vi (S ) :
In addition, it is easy to see that
EVi(I   [ij]) 
1X
 0=1

0 1Vi(I   [ij] N);
since the grand coalition is e¢ cient. Moreover,
EVi(I)  max
j 6=i
(Vi(I   [ij]) + EVi(I   [ij])) ;
since Vi(I  N) < Vi(I   [ij] N):
Lemma 5 Consider a sequence ending in a partition [12] ; [13] ; or [23] and
the subgame following this sequence. Then in every MPE any proposer o¤ers
to form the grand coalition and all the countries/trading blocs agree on it.
Lemma 5 says that, for any discount rate, if two countries have formed
a trading bloc then the grand coalition will form in the next period. It also
implies that EVi(S ) = 1 Vi(S  N) for any sequence S 2 fI   [12] ; I  
[13] ; I   [23]g:
Now let us consider the countriesbehavior following sequence S = I:
We start with the case where countries have a low discount factor.
Proposition 6 If the discount factor  is su¢ ciently low and the countries
are not too asymmetric, in the only MPE the grand coalition is formed at
period 1.
We now examine under what conditions a two-country trade bloc is
formed rst.
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Proposition 7 Let [ij] be the solution to
max
[ij]2f[12];[13];[23]g

1
2
 (I   [ij]) + (Vk (I)  Vk (I   [ij]))

:
When  is high enough, countries i and j form a trading bloc rst in the
unique MPE.
For symmetric countries the result in terms of the discount rate can be
stated more precisely:
Corollary 8 Assume that the three countries are identical and let
 =
Vi(I  N)  Vi(I   [ij])
Vi (I   [ij] N)  Vi(I   [ij]) 2 (0; 1) :
Then if  <  the grand coalition forms immediately and if  <  < 1; the
grand coalition forms via an intermediary trading bloc.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we show that each countrys benet from free trade depends on
how free trade is reached. It is reached directly or via an intermediate stage
where only a subset of countries form a trading bloc. When two countries
form a trading bloc rst, these countries impose a negative externality on the
welfare of the third country. If the third country merge with them to form
the grand coalition and engage free trade, the payo¤ to the third country is
less than if all countries initially go directly to free trade. In fact, the third
countrys payo¤from free trade can be lower than those in the noncooperative
equilibrium.
The analysis will lead to similar results if countries form customs unions
(that is, decide to pursue free trade internally and apply common external
tari¤s to non-members). If an intermediate agreement is available, being
kept out of a custom union can clearly hurt a country.
16
Appendix 1: Equilibrium taxes and tari¤s
Taxes on a domestic rm decrease both domestic consumer surplus (3) and
the domestic rms prots due to the decrease in its production (1) but
increase in tari¤/tax revenue. Unless the domestic rm is very ine¢ cient
relative to the domestic demand, the negative e¤ect on domestic consumer
surplus and prots dominates the positive e¤ect on tari¤/tax revenue. If
demand in every country is high enough this implies that no taxes should be
imposed on the domestic rm. Formally:
Remark 9 In any partition of the countries into trading blocs, taxes on the
domestic rm are set equal to zero, i.e., tii = 0; i = 1; 2; 3:
Proof of Remark 9. We omit the proof since it is included in the
proof of the following Lemmas.
Now, let us consider countriesdecisions on tari¤s. Obviously, these de-
cisions depend on the existing partition of trading blocs.
Lemma 10 The grand coalition chooses free trade and no taxes on domestic
rms, i.e., tij = 0 for all i; j = 1; 2; 3.
Proof of Lemma 10. The grand coalition sets the vector (tij) ; i; j =
1; 2; 3; in order to maximize total welfare
3P
i=1
Wi. It is easy to show that
@

3P`
=1
W`

@ti1
 
@

3P`
=1
W`

@ti2
= (c1   c2) and
@

3P`
=1
W`

@ti2
 
@

3P`
=1
W`

@ti3
= (c2   c3) :
Thus, given that c1  c2  c3, we have
@

3P`
=1
W`

@ti1

@

3P`
=1
W`

@ti2

@

3P`
=1
W`

@ti3
:
Moreover, when ai > 11c3   5 (c1 + c2) ; then
@

3P`
=1
W`

@ti3
< 0 and all of these
derivatives are negative, implying that the solution will be free trade and
zero taxes (Note that by assuming that tij  0; we rule out the possibility of
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subsidization). Hence, if demands are high enough (a su¢ cient condition is
ai > 11c3   5c2   5c1 for all i) the grand coalition sets free trade.
The intuition behind this result is simple. Tari¤s set by country i on
country j decrease the domestic consumer surplus and rm js prots in
country i while increase country is revenue from tari¤s. However, when
demands are high enough as compared to production costs, the negative
e¤ects dominate the positive ones. For any country, tari¤s on the most
e¢ cient rm (i.e., the rm with lowest unit cost) are the most harmful for
global welfare. When the countries collude on tari¤s, they fully internalize
the e¤ects of tari¤s. Therefore, if countriesdemands are su¢ ciently high, it
is optimal to have all the rms producing in the most e¢ cient way (i.e., not
increasing the e¤ective costs of any rm in such a way that this rm does
not produce for this market).
Lemma 11 When all countries are alone, in equilibrium country i sets
tij =
3
10
ai   110ci + 320ck   720cj, where i; j; and k are distinct countries.
Proof of Lemma 11. The Nash equilibrium in tari¤s is the xed
point of the best reply functions of the three countries. Country i sets (tij),
j = 1; 2; 3; in order to maximizeWi: The rst order conditions of this problem
do not depend on the tari¤s set by the other two countries, implying that
the Nash equilibrium is in fact an equilibrium in dominant strategies. By
analyzing the rst order conditions, we conclude that there is no interior
solution where country is three tari¤s take positive values. Domestic welfare
Wi is decreasing in the tari¤ on the own rm for all the combinations of
the other tari¤s (that are compatible with non-negative production levels).
Hence, tii = 0: When ai is high enough (a su¢ cient condition is ai > 11c3  
5c2   5c1), tari¤s on the imports by the foreign rms are interior and are
given by tij = 310ai   110ci + 320ck   720cj for distinct i; j; and k.
Since the domestic welfare does not take into account the e¤ects of tari¤s
on foreign rmsprots, the tari¤s on these rms are positive. However,
under our assumption on demands all the rms are active in the domestic
market. Optimal tari¤s are increasing in the domestic demand and decreasing
in the production cost of the domestic rm. In addition, the foreign rm that
has a cost advantage will pay a higher tari¤.
Finally, there are three possible cases (partitions) where two countries
form a trading bloc that we have to consider: (f1; 2g; f3g); (f2; 3g; f1g) and
(f1; 3g; f2g): Let us consider the general case of (fi; jg; fkg):
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Lemma 12 Assume that countries i and j form a trading bloc and k is the
outsider. Then in equilibrium countries in the trading bloc set
a) tii = tjj = tij = tji = 0 (i.e., free trade within the trading bloc and no
taxes on domestic rms) and
b) t`k = 519a` +
1
19
(c` + cm)  719ck where `;m 2 fi; jg and ` 6= m;
while country k sets
c) tk` = 310ak   110ck   720c` + 320cm, where `;m 2 fi; jg and ` 6= m:
Proof of Lemma 12. Consider rst (Wi +Wj), the joint welfare for
the countries in the trading bloc fi; jg. It is easy to check that if the demands
are high enough, we have @(Wi+Wj)
@t`m
< 0 for all `;m 2 fi; jg; implying that
it is optimal to set free trade and zero taxes in the trading bloc (given that
the possibility of subsidies is ruled out). In fact, doing so is a dominant
strategy since, since the best response function for the trading bloc does
not depend on the outsiders tari¤s. Moreover, when the demands are high
enough, the trading bloc sets positive tari¤s on the outsider ks products t`k =
5
19
a` +
1
19
(c` + cm)  719ck where `;m 2 fi; jg and ` 6= m: The maximization
problem of country k (who is not in the trading bloc) resembles the case
where all countries are alone: When demands are high, country k imposes
zero taxes on the domestic rm and sets positive tari¤s on the foreign rms.
These tari¤s depend on production costs of the foreign rm: a higher tari¤
is applied to the more e¢ cient rm. These tari¤s are such that both foreign
rms sell in the domestic market if domestic demand is high enough.
The outsider sets tari¤s in the same way as in the case where the other
countries do not reach a trade agreement.
Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 1. We show algebraically that W [ij]k < W
I
k :
W
[ij]
k  W Ik = 144936 100aick  68318 050aici+ 144936 100ajck+ 43936 100aicj+ 43936 100ajci  605772 200ckci 
683
18 050
ajcj  605772 200ckcj+ 211718 050cicj  26136 100a2i   26136 100a2j+ 315972 200c2k  557144 400c2i   557144 400
c2j
First of all, note that

W
[ij]
k  W Ik

does not depend on ak: In addition, it
is decreasing in aj (respectively in ai) :
@

W
[ij]
k  W Ik

@aj
= 1
36100
(1449ck + 439ci   1366cj   522aj) < 0:
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In order to show that W fijgk  W Ik < 0; given that
@

W
[ij]
k  W Ik

@aj
< 0; we prove
that the inequality holds for the lowest values of ai and aj that are compat-
ible with the assumption that each rm is active in all three markets. Let a
be this minimum and set ai = aj = a. Then:
W
[ij]
k  W Ik

= 1449
18 050
ack   92736 100aci   92736 100acj   605772 200ckci   605772 200ckcj +
2117
18 050
cicj   26118 050a2 + 315972 200c2k   557144 400c2i   557144 400c2j :
This expression is increasing in ck and decreasing in ci and cj: Hence,
we have to verify three di¤erent cases. Imagine that k is the most e¢ cient
country (country 1). Then, the inequality holds for the case where the three
countries have the same cost:
W
[ij]
k  W Ik

=   261
18 050
(c  a)2 < 0;
then the inequality holds everywhere.
Now consider that k is the less e¢ cient country (country 3). Then if the
inequality holds for ck = 111a and ci = cj = 0; then the inequality holds for
all combinations of parameters in this region. This is the case since at this
point:
W
[ij]
k  W Ik

=   59 409
8736 200
a2 < 0:
Finally, if k is the intermediary country in e¢ ciency terms (country 2),
then the inequality holds for ck = ci = 111a and cj = 0 :
W
[ij]
k  W Ik

=   172 277
17 472 400
a2 < 0;
and hence it holds everywhere.
This proves the result given our assumption on demands.
For completeness let us remark how

W
[ij]
k  W Ik

changes with costs.
This di¤erence is increasing in ck :
@

W
[ij]
k  W Ik

@ck
= 1449
36 100
ai +
1449
36 100
aj   605772 200ci   605772 200cj + 315936 100ck > 0;
and decreasing in the cost of the countries in the trading bloc if these coun-
tries are not too di¤erent in demand:
@

W
[ij]
k  W Ik

@ci
= 1
72200
( 2732ai + 878aj   6057ck + 8468cj   557ci) :
The larger the demand parameter of country i and the smaller the de-
mand parameter of country j the more negative is this derivative. Since the
opposite happens for
@

W
fijg
k  W Ik

@cj
both are negative if ai and aj are not too
di¤erent.
Proof of Proposition 2. We show algebraically thatW [ij]ij > W
I
i +W
I
j :
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W
[ij]
ij  W Ii  W Ij = 113950ajcj  4391900aicj  4391900ajci+ 711900aick+ 113950aici+ 711900ajck 
217
950
cicj   2133800cick   2133800cjck + 711900a2i + 711900a2j + 15077600c2i + 15077600c2j + 713800c2k:
Note that this expression does not depend on ak and is increasing in ai
and aj:
@

W
[ij]
ij  W Ii  W Ij

@ai
=   439
1900
cj +
71
1900
ck +
113
950
ci +
71
950
ai > 0:
Hence, it su¢ ces to show that it is positive for the lowest value of ai = aj = a:
The expression becomes:
  213
1900
acj  2131900aci+ 71950ack  217950cicj  2133800cick  2133800cjck+ 71950a2+ 15077600c2i +
1507
7600
c2j +
71
3800
c2k:
The expression above is decreasing in ci and cj and increasing in ck:
@

W
[ij]
ij  W Ii  W Ij

@ci
=   213
1900
a   217
950
cj   2133800ck + 15073800ci < 0 (and similar with
respect to cj); and
@

W
[ij]
ij  W Ii  W Ij

@ck
= 71
950
a  213
3800
ci   2133800cj + 711900ck > 0:
Since

W
[ij]
ij  W Ii  W Ij

is increasing in ck and decreasing in ci and cj we
have to verify three di¤erent cases. Imagine that k is the most e¢ cient
country (country 1). Then if the inequality holds for the lowest c1; c1 = 0;
and for the highest c2 and c3; a largely su¢ cient condition is c2 = c3 = 111a;
then the inequality always holds. This is the case since at this point:
W
[ij]
ij  W Ii  W Ij

= 1349
24 200
a2 > 0:
Now consider that k is the less e¢ cient country (country 3). Then if
the inequality holds for ci = cj = ck = c then the inequality holds for all
combination of parameters in this region. This is guaranteed because at this
point:
W
[ij]
ij  W Ii  W Ij

= 71
950
(a  c)2 > 0:
Finally, if k is the intermediary country in e¢ ciency terms (country 3),
then since the inequality holds for c1 = c2 = c and c3 = 11a;
W
[ij]
ij  W Ii  W Ij

= 1
7600
(172407a2 + 1223c2   24066ac) > 0;
then it holds everywhere for this last case.
This proves the result given our assumption on demands.
Proof of Proposition 3. First of all note that
Vi (I   [im] N)  Vi (I  N) = 1
6
 (I   [im]) + 1
3
(Vk (I)  Vk (I   [im])) ;
where the two terms in the right side are positive (by Proposition 1 and
2), and forming an intermediary trading bloc is always protable for the
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countries involved. Hence, minfVk (I   [jk] N) ; Vk (I   [ik] N) ; Vk(I  
N)g = Vk(I  N):
We shall show that Vk (I   [ij] N)  Vk(I  N) < 0:
Vk (I   [ij] N)   Vk(I   N) = 24 401433 200aicj + 24 401433 200ajci + 36 521433 200aick  
40 579
433 200
ajcj+
53
1200
akci+
36 521
433 200
ajck+
53
1200
akcj+
23 663
86 640
cicj  671200akck+ 623386 640cick+
6233
86 640
cjck  6781288 800a2i  40 579433 200aici  6781288 800a2j  13800a2k  30 487173 280c2i  30 487173 280c2j  22 237173 280c2k:
The expression (Vk (I   [ij] N)  Vk(I  N)) is decreasing in the de-
mand of the three countries.
@(Vk(I [ij] N) Vk(I N))
@aj
= 53
1200
ci +
53
1200
cj   671200ck   13400ak < 0:
@(Vk(I [ij] N) Vk(I N))
@ai
= 24 401
433 200
cj +
36 521
433 200
ck   6781144 400ai   40 579433 200ci < 0
and similarly for the derivative with respect to aj by symmetry. Hence,
if (Vk ((ij); N)  Vk(N)) is negative for the highest demand a for the three
countries, it would be negative everywhere. For a common (and high) de-
mand a we can rewrite:
Vk (I   [ij] N)   Vk(I   N) = 19728 880aci + 19728 880acj + 325728 880ack + 23 66386 640
cicj +
6233
86 640
cick +
6233
86 640
cjckk   365157 760a2   30 487173 280c2i   30 487173 280c2j   22 237173 280c2k:
When a goes to innity this expression is negative.
Proof of Proposition 4. Similar to the proof of Proposition 3.
Proof of Lemma 5. For all the countries the relevant compari-
son is not to form the grand coalition and then receive a payo¤ equal to
Vi(S ) + EVi(S ) or to propose the grand coalition and agree on forming
it in which case the expected payo¤ is
1P
=1
 1Vi(S   N) for any S 2
fI   [12] ; I   [13] ; I   [23]g : Since EVi(S ) <
1P
=1
 1Vi(S  N) the lemma
holds.
Proof of Proposition 6. The grand coalition is formed in the MPE if
the following two conditions hold:
(i) the proposer i prefers the grand coalition to any other outcome:
1X
=1
 1Vi(I N)  max fVi(I) + EVi(I); Vi(I   [ij]) + EVi(I   [ij]) for j 6= ig :
(ii) the other two countries agree:
1X
=1
 1Vj(I  N)  Vj(I) + EVj(I):
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When  ! 0 the countries care only about their current payo¤s. The previous
conditions can be rewritten as:
Vi(I  N)  max fVi(I); Vi(I   [ij]) for j 6= ig
and
Vj(I  N)  Vj(I) for j 6= i:
Since the grand coalition is e¢ cient and the surplus is shared equally, the
second inequality holds while the rst one holds if the countries are not too
asymmetric.
Proof of Proposition 7. When  goes to 1; waiting to be the proposer
is costless, the relevant comparison for any country is:
Vi (I   [ij] N)  max fVi(I); Vi(I  N)g
for i; j; k distinct.
Since the condition is satised for any pair of countries the coalition that
would form depends on which one generates more surplus for a two-country
trade bloc and which two-country trading bloc implies a higher loss for the
third country.11 To see this, rst note that is easy to see that for the exoge-
nous equal sharing rule of the surplus that we use:
Vi (I   [ij] N)  Vi (I  N) = 1
6
 (I   [ij]) + 1
3
(Vk (I)  Vk (I   [ij])) :
Where both terms on the right side are positive. Hence, the coalition that
forms is the one that
Max
[ij]2f[12];[13];[23]g

1
2
 (I   [ij]) + (Vk (I)  Vk (I   [ij]))

for i; j; k distinct.
Proof of Corollary 8. For symmetric countries, the grand coalition
will always form. The sequence may depend on countriesdiscount factors.
The condition for the grand coalition to form immediately can be written as
1X
=1
 1Vi(I  N)  Vi(I   [ij]) + 
1X
=1
 1Vi (I   [ij] N) :
11If only a pair of countries (i; j) satises this condition the rst time that i or j is called
to be the proposer the two-country coalition forms.
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From this condition we can determine  that makes both sides equal. In this
case:  = Vi(I N) Vi(I [ij])
Vi(I [ij] N) Vi(I [ij]) : Hence, for all  <  the grand coalition forms
immediately in the only MPE outcome of the game. Forming a two-country
coalition, anticipating that the grand coalition will be formed in the next
period, is superior for the proposer than to form the grand coalition straight
away if
Vi(I   [ij]) + 
1X
=1
 1Vi (I   [ij] N) 
1X
=1
 1Vi(I  N);
which is equivalent to saying that  > .
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